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Jose Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) claimed that since 1914, with the publica-
tion of his Meditations on Quixote, the basis of all his thinking had been the 
phenomenon of human life. I Both Ortega and his commentators have noted 
the similarity of his idea of human life to certain aspects of recent German 
philosophy, most especially to the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund 
Husser\. The purpose of this paper is to describe some delimited aspects of 
this relation that have previously passed unnoticed, namely (1) Ortega's 
rejection of what he considered to be the "idealism" of these thinkers, and 
(2) Ortega's establishment of the idea of life as a new conception of reality 
which would not succumb to what he considered to be the erroneous 
idealistic presuppositions of Dilthey and Husser\. 
Before we can proceed with this task, however, it is necessary to outline 
what it was that Ortega understood by the term "life." The word is a 
terminus technicus in his philosophy and does not refer primarily to biologi-
cal phenomena. Rather, by "life" Ortega referred to the fundamental reality 
given to human experiences, i.e., our life as we actually live it. The question 
of the nature of our life is not answered by such a physical science as 
biology, for its common meaning is best revealed when the person speaks of 
his or her life in the biographical sense of ordinary discourse. For Ortega, 
man's being exists as self-disclosure, and what is most immediately and most 
transparently disclosed is his own life. We may note here that Ortega's 'life' 
is a general expression for what the previous German tradition of Lebens-
philosophie had termed das Leben, the components of which are meaning-
fully connected "lived experiences" (Er/ebnisse). For Ortega as for Dilthey 
and the Lebensphilosophie movement, the experiential character of life is 
"lived" and presented from the "inside" of the subject, as it were. Life is 
not externally given to us through the senses in the manner of the physical 
world, and its nature is not inferred through sense observation and hypoth-
esis formation which led to the covering laws of matter. Rather, its immedi-
ate givenness is its actual being. Esse est percipi. Our awareness and the 
content of which we are aware become a unity, but a unity which knows 
itself and is evident to itself. Thus, for Ortega it is always possible to reflect 
on our life, to bring it to an immediate and clear self-consciousness. 
Ortega's was not a theory of life, but what might be called a phenomeno-
logical description of it. To verify or falsify a description we must observe 
our life to see if the description "fits" what we actually live, for this is our 
fundamental evidence on the subject.' Also, for Ortega there are three 
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characteristics of life: first, life is, as we have noted, awareness of itself; 
second, life makes itself; third, life decides itself. The latter two characteris-
tics imply for the concept that life is an entity that consists not only of 
present self-awareness, of what actually is, but of what it is going to make 
of itself and of what it will become. Therefore, at the basis of life there are 
praxiological and temporal attributes (Ortega, 1969, p. 57). 
But Ortega added another disideratum to his concept of life which 
would prove vital for his subsequent critique of Dilthey and Husserl's 
purported idealism: his idea of "circumstance." With this notion, he wanted 
to say that life is a polar entity; it consists of an 'I' with what is not an 'I.' 
This "not-I" is circumstance or world. Any phenomenological reflection on 
life will reveal that it is always in a world, i.e., that life is always outside 
itself in the midst of circumstances or surroundings. Life, then, is not given 
as only pure consciousness or idea; what is given, rather, is that life is always 
directed outside itself to a circumstantial world. For Ortega life is a polar 
concept, a "unitary duality" of subject and object, a fusion of 'I' and its 
actual circumstances. "I am myself and my circumstances" became his 
philosophical battle cry. For Ortega any idealist claim or assumption that 
the polar nature of life will convert to pure consciousness or idea is false. 
Such a conversion would make the subjective pole into what it is not, i.e., 
an immanent mental substance exclusive of a world. On the other hand, a 
realist position which maintains that reality is an objective thing indepen-
dent of an 'I' is also false. For Ortega, life or reality is not the independent 
being of an independent object, nor is life a self-enclosed consciousness. 
Life is always given as a polar immediacy and dynamic interaction of an 'I' 
anda world. 
Ortega thus believed he had overcome the errors of both idealism and 
realism in his conception of life. Realism holds, he claimed, that the 
fundamental being of things is res, which is independent of the subject. But 
Ortega's life idea requires that the external world can have an indubitable 
and objective status only for the subject for whom it is there (1969, p. 135). 
But idealism's attempt to convert everything into the immediacy of thought 
also appeals to something not actually given in the immediate presence of 
life, i.e., that the world is idea. What there truly is for Ortega is not an idea, 
an independent consciousness, nor an independent objective world, but an 
'I' existing in a set of circumstances that also exist. Only the coexistence of I 
and world "without chance of fusion or separation" is fundamentally 
given.' For Ortega this coexistence is the fundamental reality on which 
philosophy must meditate (1975, p. 55). 
Ortega saw his own vitalism in the related context of the thinking of both 
Dilthey and Husser\. I would now like to discuss one aspect of this compli-
cated relation by comparing Ortega's idea of life with a similar notion in 
Dilthey, and also to show how his idea provided Ortega with one basis for a 
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critique of Husserl. Most especially, I would like to state the interrelation of 
all three thinkers in the context of Ortega's critique of idealism. Let us begin 
by looking briefly at Ortega's relation to Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). 
Ortega stated that while he knew of Dilthey's existence at the turn of the 
century in Berlin, he had not read his works until 1929. It took him, he 
claimed, four more years to understand Dilthey, and the lateness of his start 
cost him ten years of intellectual development.· Dilthey's Gesammelte Sch-
riften began to appear in Europe in 1928, and Ortega admitted in his 1933 
essay on Dilthey that the idea of life had been discovered by the latter in the 
late nineteenth century. Yet Ortega also said in 1934 that he had not reached 
the idea of life as the fundamental reality by "positive imitation of anyone." 
Rather, he was directed to it by the problems that confront philosophy itself 
(1975, p. 60). 
If this is true, then what may we say is the comparative status of the idea 
in these two thinkers? Dilthey, too, had claimed that his idea of life had 
given a new meaning to the expression "to be real." For him das Leben is 
also a terminus technicus. It refers primarily not to a biological state, but to 
the inner conscious processes of all humanity, and to the meaningful rela-
tions our individual life has to the lives of other men.' For Dilthey, life is 
always an "inner" or subjective event in the sense that it is always experi-
enced as one's internal condition. Life is never given to us externally in the 
manner of sense data, for its givenness is always equal to its being experi-
enced from the inside. The subject intends his own life as an object. Thus 
the subject and object of human experience become identical. This self-
awareness (innere Wahrnehmung) is given as an immediate and self-evident 
presentation of the life world as it actually is. Esse est percipi is also a 
formula that covers Dilthey's sense of life's immediacy. The life of the 
individual is not perceived as a mere appearance which covers a deeper 
reality, for Dilthey identified it with reality itself. Thus, it is not required 
that external sense perception will provide the empirical basis for our 
judgments here; for "in the internal world of our subjective life, we com-
prehend reality as it actually is without the mediation of the external sense 
world.' 
Dilthey's claims, stated above, were sanctioned by Ortega, but he as-
serted that Dilthey's fundamental error-an error which Ortega did not 
want to duplicate in his own vitalism-lay in Dilthey's claim that the 
contents of life experience "are comported as ideas, as consciousness." 
Here, Ortega points his critical finger at what he considers Dilthey's ideal-
ism. Ortega had noted correctly that for Dilthey everything which exists is 
subject to being a fact of consciou!.ness.' Ortega attempted to distinguish 
his vitalist position from that of Dilthey's by revealing the latter's idealist 
presuppositions. As we saw above, Ortega had previously rejected all 
idealism as one-sided because it lacked a credible "world" component in its 
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epistemology. It is because of such considerations that Ortega would claim 
in his Leibniz volume that because of his belief in consciousness "it is stupid 
to say that Dilthey has influenced my thinking." Ortega also claimed that 
his idea of life was different from Dilthey's and not derived from it.' Yet in 
his History as System, Ortega also claimed that Dilthey was "the writer to 
whom he owed more than anyone else" (1962, p. 216). 
But I believe that Ortega's claim to originality is justified when we 
remember that for him the idea of life can never be understood as con-
sciousness as in Dilthey. For Ortega life is always directed outwardly to an 
actual world-pole. For him life is given as a fusion of the 'I' and its 
circumstances in the world. This relationship will never convert to con-
sciousness alone. Just as life is not the "I-independent" res of the realist 
position, so is it not a consciousness without an objective world pole. This 
formulation of Ortega's will suggest at once Heidegger's assertion that 
"being in the world" is a real existential component of Dasein, an idea, 
incidentally, for which Ortega claimed ideological priority" 
We can note, finally, that the same anti-idealist tone is present in Ortega's 
analysis of the early phenomenological movement in Germany. Indeed, 
before 1914 Ortega had considered using phenomenology as a vehicle for 
his own thinking. But he came to feel that certain shortcomings in Husserl's 
movement would prohibit his formulation of systematic insights which 
Ortega would present in his own philosophy. For example, Ortega claimed 
that there was an unacceptable idealist element in Husserl's thought. By 
this, he meant that the latter's notion of "pure consciousness" is not 
justified in any experiential presentation. "It is not phenomenological de-
scription, but hypothesis" he stated, "to claim that an act of consciousness 
is real." For Ortega there was no such thing as "consciousness of" as a 
general frame of mind (1971, p. 281). With these criticisms in mind Ortega 
claimed that he "abandoned phenomenology at the first taste of it" (1971, 
p. 280). The purported phenomenological description of a Husserlian 
"pure consciousness" must be replaced by a description of the actual 
phenomena of human life as Ortega understood it. 
Also, for Ortega the phenomenological "hypothesis" of consciousness 
does not adequately account for the actual relation between the subject and 
his world. What actually exists, what actually is given, he claimed, is not 
pure consciousness, but man in relation to things and things to man. 
Further, if consciousness were "absolute reality" and the true starting point 
of all philosophy, as Husserl had claimed, then philosophy would begin 
from a subject "enclosed in itself" and be without reference to objective 
content. For Ortega such a situation would be the opposite of what obtains 
in life. For life is a "reaching out from oneself" to objective circumstances. 
We can note too that between the years 1900 and 1925 Ortega refused to 
publish his reservations about the phenomenological movement because of 
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what he considered the "enormity" of his claims about consciousness (1971, 
p.281). 
In summary, Ortega's claim to originality in his idea of life seems 
justified by his rejection of Dilthey's idealism and by his emphasis on a 
"world" component in the idea. Also, in Ortega we find the rejection of 
any idealism which asserts (1) the hypothesis of consciousness; (2) that the 
world pole component of the life idea can be dissolved into a Husserlian 
subjectivity or immanence of consciousness; and (3) that human existence 
can be understood as an idea without a world, or that there is an objective, 
real world without a subject. It is the contention of this paper that because 
of Ortega's additions, modifications, and restrictions to his notion of life, 
he has made an original contribution to the history of ideas. 
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